MILITARY THOUGHT: "THE PROBLEM OF COMBAT WITH THE NUCLEAR MEANS

Created: 8/1/1961

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

COUNTRY SUBJECT

USSR

L"igZ*B 'The Problei

mbat wiin tne Nuclear Moans of the Enemy and Itsy Chief Marshal of Artillery S. Yarentsov

OF INFO: August1

SOURCE

A reliable source

Followingerbatim translation of an article entitled The Problem of Combat with the Nuclear Means

eu?neKy,*n2 !tSichwritten by Chief Marshal of Artillery S. Varentsov.

This article appeared in1pecial version of the Soviet journal Military inought which is classified SECRET by the Soviets

andispublished Irregularly.

to press onugust

the Table of Contents for tfiis

nnt-: "MiUtarY Thought" Is published by meUiw Ministry of Defense in three versions,

SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version is issued monthly, while the other two versions are Issued irregularly. otalssues of the TOP SECRET version were published by

Xf0 andher 4 By the end of 61 issues of thehad been published,f then during present article Is tne first one to bethe SECRET version. Tne

version was first disclosed by

The RESTRICTED version has existed since nd was occasionally available through official puhllcaJ-lona

he that tiS veraionen acquired Clandestinely since

* APPROVED TOR RttERSE

ll6o

The Problem of Combat with the Nuclear Means of the Enemy and Its Solution by

Chief Marshal of Artillery S. Varentsov

ai;,Sof .belligerents

in the light of their capabilities

and of their capacity for the employment of nuclear weaponsodern operation the side which can win fire supremacy' over the enemy, primarily in nuclear weapons, will win The conduct of any operation, especially in the initial periodar, is inconceivable without reliableof the nuclear means of the enemy.

The experience of exercises and of operational games

y6arS Showsand senior

officers still have an inadequate understanding of theof the problem of combat with the nuclear moansenemy and of the whole set of problems which mustin ordor to reduce his ability to use theseour

Af,ls eenerally known, our probable enemyuantity of means of nuclear attack, suchmissiles and free rockets and atomic artillerywhich use nuclear ammunition. In thea frnnt there can beof missile and artillery batteries, using

-batteriesm howitzerm cannon,and battalions of "Honest John" andof "Little John" free rockets (NCRS)"Lacrosse"p to

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-mounts for "Redstone" guided missilesattalions of "Corporal" or "Sergeant" guideddetachments of "Matador" or "Mace" cruise-missilesup

It is fully understandable that nuclear weapons must be destroyed in the shortest possible periods, calculated in minutes, after they have been detected in order to prevent the enemy from delivering nuclear strikes. First of all, in every case, the missile and artillery batteries using nuclear ammunition, located at launch and firing sites, must be In this process, primary attention should be given to the destruction of batteries of long-range missiles such as theSergeant" and "Pershing" The range of these batteries permits the enemy to deliver nuclear strikes against our missile units and against the disposition areas of combined-arms large units and command posts and airfields.

Reconnaissance must be aimed first of all at providing mensuration dataannyye on the enemy's missile batteries, armed withSergeant" and Pershing" nissilcs. At the same time, the disposition of tbe nuclear means of divisions deployed on the immediate border during the initial periodar or in direct contact with our troops during the war must be reconnoitered.

** generally known, our probable enemy imposes great

tasks on his aviation in tne'deliVery of nuclear strikes

against our troops. To be specific, aviation may receive.of; the. total ofge lea? weaponValTocated lor .inj^cmion. tly , thH destruction of aiivraft on the airfields where they are based, is one of the most important tasks in the combat with the nuclear means of the enemy.

In the zone of a front th.*re may be up torirfields for the enemy's tactical aviation. Since these will normally be reliably protectedhole system of antiair defense, the delivery of strikes against them will be entrusted to the missile troops in the first instance.

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- ,aAPici

Hot onlyront but_also those of ths High Command (Glavnoyc Koaandovaniye) will operate" against the airfields in.th'c initial periodar. To dostroy the aircraft of the eneoy which useis. figuratively, to tear the nuclear sword froa his hands.

Together with the missile batteries and aviation the most important targets in the combat with the enemy's nuclear means are the assembly bases and depots forhe mam mass of nuclear ammunition, and, during Initial combat operations, up toercent of the nuclear ammunition which it is planned to use in the operation, may be located at these points In the initial periodar. The destruction of the assembly bases and depots for nuclear ammunition is also one of the most important tasks, not onlyront, but also of the missile troops of the High Command. The destruction of the assembly bases and depots for nuclear ammunitionheater of military operations radically weakens the enemy in his use of nuclear weapons against our troops. If the destruction of these targets is skilfully organized, the enemy will be compelled not only to rcviso (redistribute) but also materially to restrict hisof nuclear .weapons.

In order to be sure of weakening nemy In his use of nuclear weapons against our troops. It is necessary to devote most serious attention to the destruction of such targets as command posts, control centers for reconnaissance and artillery fIre-directing aircraft and the enemy's radlc-tecnnical means.

At command posts all the questions connected with the combat use of nuclear weapons are worked out. Specifically the reconnaissance of targets is organized; plans are made for the delivery of nuclear strikes, and for the direction of missile units and aviation up to the issue of theommands for the delivery of nuclear strikes. Destruction of the enemy's command posts therefore makes It possible to resolve the mainhe substantial weakening of the enemy in his organization of the use of nuclear weapons

he

In resolving the questions of combat with th*

operations. It is desirahiP firTffl* placeedstrikes against th simultaneously

tanttareetS and the

objectives Torter to "deliver theS*

If we deprive the enemv ofstrikes against them.

fire-directing street, artill*rv

filment of the basic task of weakeningnSUrC thC

S SISSY'S *

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In this way, in order to weaken

into weaken the enemy fundamentally

in his employment of nuclear weapons and In orderwith them, reconnaissance must beand mensuration data must be obtained^objectives

-the launch sites of missile batteries;

"ISl"ieS -hiC"

"aircraft-*irfleldSbomberter-bomber

-the assembly bases and depots for nuclear ammunition.

In addition to these basic objectives, it is also necessary to Obtain mensuration data on the command posts of groups of armies, field armies, army corps andon aviation control centers; on base airfields forand artillery fire-direction aircraft and on ?he main centers of radio electronic intelligence.

,ha Io tbePeriodar the task of destroying ,t 2en?must be performed by the first

o^ed,%tHlke;,bC,0re the grouDd forcesh* front previously reCon-

on. Prior recon-

f ?Jnftn nucXear objectives may take place OXheofopsm1* < he number of aircraft which

r2rhobuersaraUable

ar' of destroying nuclear th"^ J be completely performedassed strikeHtn fcn:iQKa"perationront and then, as they are exposed and as mensuration data are

str^es ecessar* by grouped nucleartho "Pauses" between- operations (if

asbe destroyed nuclear strike? ' inBle'"by grouped

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Oneof the meet iirpcrUn- tasks in the period offor an offensive operation is not to allow the enemy to carryuclear strike on the main grouping of the troops

a front, in order to break up our offensive. If itpositively known that the enemy is preparing and will try to delivertrike, it will be necessary toit and,assod nuclear strike of our own, to destroy as great a number as possible of theobjectives. In order to perform this task, inwith their deployment, missile units must immediately prepare for strikes against nuclear and then against other objectives cn which the enemy's capability to organize the use of nuclear weapons depends.

In defense, in order to break up an enemy offensive, it is also necessary toassed nuclear strike directed primarily against the nuclear moans, command posts and main groupings of the enemy's troops. assed strike,executed and supplemented by new strikes against the enemy troops (if this isill allow afrom the defensive to the offensive.

khas been said' lt is evident that in organizing

"UClear neaGStb* enen^ we ca""Ot

restricted to reconnaissance and to the destruction of subunits whicn are immediately capable of using nuclear

^aS?3S'kthe stru66le for nuclear supremacy is considerably greater. It must include combat with the whole complex of forces and means, which the enemy nakes use of in employing nuclear weapons.

_ j Perform this task it is necessary to establish an

fiy a all-embracing system, in which will be included ail the forces and means necessary for reconnaissance and control ear area and, lastly, precise

Let us first examine the means of destruction which can be used to weaken the enemy, in .the nuclear sense. These are, above all others, nuclear missile weapons, which have great range coverage (diapazon dalnosti) and vast destructive capability.

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The principal tasks in combatingclear means of the enemy will be accomplished by missile large units and units of the ground forces missile large units and operational-tactical units and independent (otdelnyy) battalions of tactical missiles.

At present missile larg^ ur,its and tacticalmissile units *re organisationally presented as army and front missile brigadess independent missile battalions attached to fronts for reinforcement. In addition, for combat with the enemy's nuclear weapons, the battalions of tactical missiles cf the motorized rifle and tank divisions, can be used in an army. ront has missile weapons capable of combating the enemy's nuclear means, disposed within tho limits of both the tactical and the operational depth.

Inof need, missile large units and units of tho missile troops of the High Command may also be called ln to combat the _enemy_fs nuclear means on behalfront. They will be used for the destruction of the main enemy nuclear objectives, which are unattainable for the missile troops of the front or for the front's aviation. To such objectives belong the assembly bases and depots, the launch sites of long-range ballistic missiles, communications centers, airfields, ports, loading and unloading stations and the sites of cruise missiles wnich have great range of action -

The .characteristics of means of combat, besides the range of fire, are the time needed to prepare for the deliverytrike after receipt of the command, the accuracy of fire and the yield of the nuclear warhead.

The time taken to prepare the missile for launching has particular significance ln the destruction of the enemy's nuclear weapons at their sites. arget has been detectedite, it is necessary to destroy it as quickly as possible, in order to forestall the enemy in the deliverytrike. Here we rust bear in mind that the enemy's nuclear means willheir sitesery limited time before delivery of the strike. Thus, for

atteryof "Honest John" or "Lacrosse" requires not more thaninutes toosition and to prepare to openattery ofp to one hour. It is true that, when detected, these weapons may be at varying degrees of read.nass tof we take their readiness asercent, we will have an average ofinutes to destroy tactical missilesnd atomic artillery andinutes to destroy operationalactical missiles.

In defining the time for the delivery of strikes against the enemy's nuclear weapons one must also consider the reliability with which thev can be destroyed. Thispercent. In order that this reliability can be ensured, the above-mentioned period will shorten still further; for tactical weaponsinutes and for operational-tactical weapons, fromoinutes. During this period, the reconnaissance data must be received andecision must be taken and relayed to the firing subunits and the latter must be prepared for the deliverytrike or for opening fire.

As the experience of exercises has shown,arge proportion of this period is spent in the receipt andof reconnaissance data, since they pass through many departments, and also in the makingecision and in relaying it to subunits. Thus, for example,eries of exercises,oinutes'were" spent in the makingecision and intrike mission against the enemy's nuclear means.

The periods taker, to prepare subunits for thea strike or for opening fire are at presentthe utmost and are limited only by the technicalof the firing means. At the present timemissile subunits of army and frontcan be ready toissileinutes of the receipt of the coordinates of asubunits of tactical missilesoinutes.

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The accuracy of fire of tbe missiles must behigh, or alternately must be compensated for by greater yield in the nuclear charges.

According to, all the indications which havethe existing types of missiles of theare fully suitable for combat with themeans. In the table which is shown below,of enemy objectives are given, andyield of the nuclear charges, which canin operational-tactical and tactical

From analysis of the table it is clear that the missile units of the ground troops can successfully combat all the troop objectives of the enemy which are connected with the employment of nuclear weapons. In accordance with the yield of the nuclear warhead used to destroy one objective or another, the problem of destroying either both materiel and personnel or only the personnel and some of the equipment can be resolved.

iiftONBAfffl

The proper selection of the elementarget whtCffi is to be destroyed is of very great significance. For example, the combat formationroup of "Redstone" guided missiles consists of the firing positions of the launch batteries and of the disposition area* of the fire control point, of headquarters, engineer and technical artillery companies, at distancescm from one another. The launching mounts on the launch sites and the engineer and technical artillery companies can serve as independentfor destruction. At the different periods of their combat operations one of these objectives will assume the greatest importance, and if reconnaissance provides thedata, the point of aim for the strike must be set there. Otherwise, we will be compelled totrike against all the objectives which have been exposed.

A group ofruise-missiles are disposed in two areas, preparatory and launching, separatedistancem. roup of cruise missiles constitutes four separate objectives for destruction.

A tactical aviation airfield (one squadron on themay occupy an area ofom*. However, the aircraft on their hardstands, the fuel and munition depots, or the control points, disposed over considerably smaller areas, may be selected for destruction.

Supply points and depots for special types of weapons, depending on their significance, (points in corps rear areas, army depots, depots in the forward area or base depots in the administrative zone; may havendoeparate storage places, disposed in separate groups torage places) at distancesm from one another. For the destructionhole point or depot, as many nuclear warheads as there -ire separate groups of storage places exposed by reconnaissance will be needed.

In delivering nuclear strikes against objectives it is necessary to select the type and height of the nuclear burst properly. Air bursts will be those most frequently produced*

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although for the destructioneries of objectives, of those which are deeply disposed, ground bursts may be more effective, providing greater destruction of the enemy by the generation of high levels of radioactiveof the area.

For the destruction of the enemy's nuclear means in operational and tactical depth, operational-tactical and tactical missiles with chemicalhimicheskom snaryazhenii) may be used; but in this case, as in the case of nuclear ground bursts, the possible direction of the wind in the target area must be considered. To destroyoercent of the personnelattalion (battery) of "Honest John" rockets,m howitzers orm cannon, firinginimum distance, two, andaximum distance, three of four tactical missiles with chemical fillers will be required.

Artillery is sufficiently effective for combat with the enemy's tactical nuclear means, especially long-range gun artillery. The ability of artillery to open highly accurate fire quickly permits it to be considered at present as one of the important means of combat withmm cannon, "Honestnd "Lacrosse" missiles on their firing positions, and alsoeans for the destruction of their observation and command posts and radar station sites.

The main quantity of the enemyTs nuclear means, as is generally known, is.located within the limits of thedepth, istanceom, from the eT^eredVyy kray). esult, the main burden of" combat with them falls upon the missile battalions and divl sional artillery and also upon the army missile units.

The enemy's tactical means for nuclear attack, located at positions within the range of tube artillery, may be destroyed by the fire of the latter. The expenditure of shells will depend on the dimensions of the target, the range of fire, the method of determining coordinates, and the method of preparing data for firing. With tho greatest accuracy of fire preparation, an "Honest John" or Lacrosse" battery can be destroyedattalion within 5 toinutes, with an expenditureissiles.

The effectiveness of destruction is increased if chemical warheads are used. Inase the expenditure of shells can be less. However, for this, it is necessary that the fire against the entmy is carried out unexpectedly and that he is not able to take advantage of antichemical installations or of other means of defense.

In destroying the nuclear means of the enemy, tube artillery must bring fire to bear net only on the firing or launch sites but also on the fire control points of these subunits. For example, the fire of tube artillery against the radar guidance stationattalion of "Lacrosse" disposedistancem from the forward edge can knock the battalion out of actionrolonged period. Thus, tube artillery must take its position In the overall system of combat with the nuclear means of the enemy. In our opinion, it is necessary to have more long-range gun. artillery in an army.

One must keep in mind that, at present, only missile units and artillery are capable of destroying the enemy's missile mounts and artillery weapons in timely fashion at their launch sites or firing positions before they deliver strikes against our troops, that is. in the course of several minutes.

Besides this. It is clear that the existing periods for the preparation of the weapons of nuclear attack of the enemy will not remain the same for any length of time; theyonstant tendency to become shorter, in accordance with the assimilation of missile equipment and with the introduction into the latter of electronic instruments for the checkout and preparation of missiles for launching.

Therefore, bearing in mindonsiderable number of the enemy's nuclear weapons will be located on launch sites or firing positions during the course of an operation we mustystem for combat with them which can ensure tneir destruction within the very shortest periods.

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llflONBARKl

The methods for the organization of control andviews on the employment of missiles and artillery for the destruction of nuclear means, which exist at present, do not correspond in any degree with present requirements. For example, for the destructionCorporal" guided missile, detected on its site, we must open fire withinoinutes from the moment of its detection; but on some exercises up to lj hours and more were required for this. An analysis of the organization of similar strikeseries of exercises showsreat portion of this excessively long time is taken up with transmission andof reconnaissance data, with preparation and with the makingecision in the staffront or an army.

The only proper path, along which we must go, is thatecisive examination of views on the organization of the combat with nuclear means.

First of all,efinite minumum of nuclear warheads must be specially designated,from the total number allotted for an operation^for combat with the nuclear weapons of the enemy. This fundamental decision is made by theof the troopsront (army) while nuclear warheads are being distributed in accordance with the tasks of an operation and by armies.

A decisive simplification of the whole structural scheme for the control of nuclear/missile weapons in the combat with the nuclear means of the enemy is also needed,eries of levels, and,esult, considerably shortening the time for the preparation of the means offor the delivery of strikes. It seems to us that the responsibility for the employment of missile units and artillery in combat with the enemy's nuclear weapons should be entrusted entirely to the commander of missile troops and artillery. This suggestion is also substantiated by the experience of exercises,

Arising from the need for the rapid destruction of enemy nuclear means which have been/detected, we consider that the commander of the missile troops and artillery must

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be given the right to make independent decisions on the" delivery of nuclear strikes against the nuclear means of attack of the enemy, with the limit set by the commander of the troopsront (army) for the destruction of the enemy's nuclear means.

Besides the means of destruction, the commander of the missile troops and artilleryront (army) and the commander of the artilleryivision should have the necessary reconnaissance means to obtain the coordinates of targets and also to conduct combat reconnaissance of the enemy's nuclear meansheck on the results of fire. In accordance with this, clearly, it is necessary to make definite changes in the organizational and organic structure of missile and artillery units of artillery reconnaissance units and of subunits at divisional army and front levels.

To conduct reconnaissance of the nuclear means of the enemy, the commander of the artilleryivision must have pilotless means of reconnaissance not less than two flights (zveno) of artillery-fire-direction helicopters (vertolet -korrektirovshchik) and also subunits for sound-ranging (zvukovoy) and radar reconnaissance and subunits for reconnaissance of the enemy's radar. In theivision will also require light air-reconnaissance aircraft. Divisional artillery must have not only howitzer artillery but also the necessary quantity of'gun . Given such means of reconnaissance and destruction, the division will be able to combat the enemy's tacticalns successfully.

With their own means, an armyrent will combat the nuclear means of the enemy disposed ln the operational depth. To these belongSergeant" and "Redstone" guided missile battalions, detachments of "Matador" and "Mace" cruise missiles, depots and supply points for special types of weapons, airfields and command posts. In case of necessity front and army means will also supplement the means of divisions.

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